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The Adoption of IFRS 3: The Effects of Managerial Discretion 
and Stock Market Reactions 
 
Abstract: 
In recent years several accounting standards issued by the IASB substitute measures of fair 
value for historical cost, and give managers the discretion to determine the fair value without an 
actual market for the asset. We document the accounting consequences of the adoption of IFRS 3 
and the stock market’s reaction using data from Sweden. After the adoption of IFRS 3 in January 
2005 the amount of capitalized goodwill has increased substantially. Goodwill impairments under 
IFRS are considerably lower than goodwill amortizations and impairments made under Swedish 
GAAP. An analysis of economic incentives influencing the impairment decision at the initial 
adoption of IFRS 3 show some evidence that tenured management is negatively associated with 
the impairment decision. However, most firms did not reclassify goodwill or make additional 
impairments. Firms with substantial amounts of goodwill yielded abnormally high returns 
despite that they earned abnormally low earnings. Investors seem to, correctly or incorrectly, 
have viewed the IFRS 3 related boost in earnings as an indication of higher future cash flows. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years standard-setters like the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have 
substituted historical cost-based measures with fair value-based measures (illustrated by the 
upcoming new standard on fair value measurement; ED/2009/5), with intentions to increase the 
decision usefulness of accounting information (Hitz, 2007). The IASB has pushed the use of fair 
value measures to non-financial assets where market-based measures are derived from 
managements’ own expectations of future cash flows. As pointed out by Landsman (2007) and 
others, mixing fair values and managerial discretion is cumbersome and the pros and cons of 
conservatism are now frequently discussed from both conceptual (Hitz, 2007; Chen et al., 2007) 
and empirical standpoints (e.g. LaFond and Watts, 2008). While empirical accounting research 
might be unable to directly answer standard-setting questions (Beaver, 1998) it can enlighten 
decision makers by providing ex post empirical evidence (Barth, 2006). Our study provides 
evidence of how the new standard for business combinations (IFRS 3) affects financial reporting 
and the stock market’s reactions to the new information. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) adoption of SFAS 142 in 2001, changed 
goodwill accounting from amortization of historical cost to an impairment-only approach. 
Empirical evidence from the U.S. indicates that this new approach provides a marginal increase 
in decision usefulness (e.g. Chen et al., 2004; Ahmed and Guler, 2007), but also that accounting 
choices associated with the mandatory first-time adoption were driven by economic incentives 
(Beatty and Weber, 2006). There are important differences between the U.S and the European 
setting. As U.S. firms often amortized goodwill over extensive periods of time the abolishment of 
amortizations had a limited effect on their reported earnings. When goodwill is amortized over 
shorter periods of time, as in most European countries, the effect on reported earnings is much 
greater, which strengthens the incentive to act opportunistically. In addition, a number of studies 
have claimed that earnings management is more common in Europe than in the U.S. (Leuz et al., 
2003; Lang et al., 2006). The combination of greater economic incentives and more prevailing 
earnings management makes the European adoption of IFRS 3 an interesting study object. 
However, as the standard was introduced at the same time as the general European adoption of 
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IFRS, it is difficult to disentangle the IFRS 3 effects from the effects of all other standards. To 
address this, we use Swedish data where standard-setters have translated and implemented 
IFRS for more than 15 years and where the mandatory IFRS adoption in reality only introduced a 
few new standards. Studying accounting choices in a Swedish setting is also interesting as 
Swedish accounting is deemed to be of high quality (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Our study contributes to the accounting literature in three ways. First, we document the 
accounting consequences of the switch to an impairment-only approach. According to the IFRS 
restatements firms (with goodwill) deemed IFRS 3 as the by far most important change (93.3%). 
The mandatory IFRS adoption increased earnings, mainly because of the abolished goodwill 
amortizations. On average, goodwill impairments under IFRS 3 are considerably smaller than the 
amortizations and impairments reported under Swedish GAAP. Combined with a high acquisition 
frequency, the level of goodwill soared in the years 2005 to 2007. Only a smaller part of new 
acquired goodwill has been identified as specific acquired intangible assets. And, impairments do 
not increase in the years following the IFRS 3 adoption. The effect of the IFRS 3 adoption is that 
firms have more unspecific intangible assets than ever before making future earnings more 
dependent on managers’ discretionary decisions. 
Second, we examine how managers made use of the discretion given to them in association with 
the first time adoption of IFRS 3. We find that few firms reclassified material amounts of goodwill 
to other specific intangible assets. There is some evidence that tenured management is more 
reluctant to impair goodwill at the time of the IFRS 3 adoption. We also find weak indications 
that firms with considerable proportions of goodwill are reluctant to initiate any impairment. In 
our sample most firms merely reversed the goodwill amortizations from the transition year. 
Third, we examine investors’ reactions to increased earnings following the abolishment of 
amortizations. Changes in the accounting for goodwill affect share prices, if either (1) investors 
perceive the impairment-only approach to provide new value relevant information, or (2) 
investors incorrectly interpret an increase in earnings (caused by the abolishment of goodwill 
amortizations) as an indication of higher future cash flows. Firms with large amounts of goodwill 
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have lower abnormal earnings in a seven month IFRS transition window but they yield 
considerably higher abnormal returns than firms without proportionally large goodwill balances. 
Interestingly, firms with substantial amounts of goodwill are larger; however, there is no 
difference in abnormal returns among larger firms. The reason for this appears to be that the 
positive effect on earnings caused by abolished amortizations is comparatively smaller for large 
firms and not enough to counter the difference in abnormal earnings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the regulatory 
framework. Section three discusses research on managerial discretion and formulates our 
hypotheses. The fourth section describes the data and research methodology. Section five provides 
the empirical analysis and finally, the sixth section concludes the paper. 
 
2. The regulatory framework 
Goodwill is largely the difference between the purchase price and the value of an acquired firm's 
equity. Capitalized goodwill is an intangible asset that is an indicator of excess future cash flows 
either from the acquired entity itself or from the combination of the acquired and acquiring 
entities (Johnson and Petrone, 1998). Most accounting regulators recognize acquired goodwill 
although internally generated goodwill is generally not recognized. The somewhat inconsistent 
treatment of goodwill is explained by the verifiability of acquired goodwill arising from an open 
market transaction (as noted in both IFRS 22 and APB 17). Once goodwill is capitalized, the 
question is how to subsequently account for it. Prior to the U.S. adoption of SFAS 142, most 
accounting regulators required that goodwill must be amortized over a certain period of time. The 
length of this period varied substantially between local GAAPs (APB 17 allowed U.S. firms a 
maximum of 40 years and IAS 22 allowed 10 years). Many Swedish firms applied a conservative 
view of goodwill. Until 2002, the accounting standard RR 1:96 required goodwill to be amortized 
over five years unless a longer economic life can be estimated with reasonable certainty (as 
required by Swedish law: ÅRL 4:2-4). RR 1:00 issued by Redovisningsrådet in 2002, allowed an 
economic life of maximum 20 years, but many firms continued to use a shorter economic life.1 
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The issue of SFAS 142 was a major change in how to account for goodwill. Under SFAS 142 
goodwill is measured at the smallest cash generating unit using discounted cash flow techniques 
to reflect the estimates and expectations of market participants. That is, SFAS 142 calls for fair 
value estimates of goodwill that relies on a managerial discretion, which paved the way for 
IASB’s work on IFRS 3. 
Under IAS 22 the difference between the purchase price and the value of the acquired firm’s book 
value of equity was capitalized as goodwill. IFRS 3, on the other hand, requires an identification 
of specific intangible assets in the acquired entity (such as patents, licenses and trademarks) that 
are to be capitalized separately. Depending on the nature of these intangibles they can be kept 
indefinitely or amortized over a maximum economic life of 20 years. At the time of the acquisition, 
two questions arise: (1) what is the value of identifiable intangible assets, and (2) how long is the 
economic life of these assets? 
IFRS 3 abandons the amortization of capitalized goodwill and instead the book value of goodwill 
is tested for impairment on a regular basis (IAS 36 – Impairment of Assets). Goodwill is allocated 
to the lowest level of cash-generating units (CGU). The carrying amount of the CGU’s goodwill is 
compared with its recoverable amount. If the recoverable amount is the higher of (1) the fair 
value, less costs to sell, and (2) its value in use, then there is no goodwill impairment, and the 
other value need not be determined. Presumably, the majority of firms will test for impairment by 
determining value in use, given the absence of an active market for most CGUs (Shoaf and Perez 
Zaldivar, 2005). It should be noted that the Swedish Financial Accounting Standards Council 
(Redovisningsrådet) has translated and issued IASs and IFRSs in Sweden for more than a 
decade. As a consequence, impairment tests under IAS 36 have been in use for a number of years 
prior to the adoption of IFRS 3.  
IFRS 1 (First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards) contains 
instructions on how to carry out the transition to IFRS to ensure retrospective comparability. 
However, the standard allows first-time adopters a number of exemptions including the option of 
a prospective adoption of IFRS 3. First-time adopters with capitalized goodwill have the following 
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decisions to make at the time of adoption: (1) whether to make a retrospective or a prospective 
adoption, and if a retrospective, when to start, (2) whether to reclassify goodwill created by past 
acquisitions (up until 2004) to other intangible assets, (3) the economic life of reclassified 
goodwill, and (4) whether goodwill created by past acquisitions ought to be impaired in the IFRS 
restatement (in addition to those made under local GAAP).  
 
3. Theoretical background and research hypotheses 
3.1 Effects of the adoption on financial statements 
Goodwill accounting has been a controversial topic for decades. In the early 1970s, the APB’s 
Opinion No. 17 (Intangible Assets) was criticized because the shift from manufacturing to 
‘knowledge-based’ activities would result in acquiring firms’ values being too dependent on 
something untouchable (Jennings et al., 2001). However, acquired goodwill is a consequence of an 
actual business transaction, and therefore, it cannot be ignored. Empirical evidence suggests that 
while the level of goodwill explains differences in value across firms (Jennings et al., 1996), 
goodwill amortizations provide little valuable information to investors (Kirkham and Arnold, 
1992; Jennings et al., 2001; Moehrle et al., 2001). An important point is, however, that in the U.S., 
where much of this research is conducted, goodwill amortization expenses were rarely disclosed, 
and hence there is no research documenting whether goodwill amortizations are irrelevant or not. 
Goodwill is the price paid for future excess operating returns and it is well-documented that over 
time, operating returns are mean-reverting (Nissim and Penman, 2001). Arguably, we do not 
know the mean-reversion pattern of individual firms, but in the past, standard-setters have 
conservatively kept the value of capitalized goodwill low. A conservative accounting system 
ensures that assets are not overstated (Basu, 1997) and consequently it not only imposes explicit 
constraints and reduces managers’ opportunities to introduce biases (Watts, 2003; LaFond and 
Watts, 2008), but it also reduces managers’ ability to manipulate earnings (Chen et al., 2007). All 
accounting systems exhibit conservatism to some degree and there are known systematic 
variations across firms depending on institutional (e.g. Ball et al., 2000) and corporate governance 
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factors (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; García Lara et al., 2007; 2008). Firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms in place tend to be less conservative in their financial 
reporting (García Lara et al., 2008). In fact, LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conservatism is 
a value-increasing corporate governance mechanism. The consequence of the rather conservative 
accounting approach where goodwill is systematically amortized regardless of the mean reverting 
pattern was primarily that the opportunities to opportunistically or mistakenly report excessive 
goodwill amounts were reduced. 
The reasons why the IASB turned to an impairment-only approach instead of amortizations are 
not obvious. Clearly, the move parallels the development promulgated by the FASB,2 but the 
IASB has currently moved further in the direction of value-based measures than the FASB, 
especially with respect to non-financial assets. Hitz (2007) points out that the shift to value-based 
measures fits into a more general development towards the asset-liability approach, emphasizing 
the need to report relevant information in the balance sheet. Importantly, neither the cost-based 
amortization nor the value-based impairment-only approach has cash flow effects. If 
amortizations poorly reflect a mean-reverting pattern, perhaps impairment tests are more 
informative? For such an argument to be true, the increased discretion introduced must signal 
private useful information of the future performance of business units. 
The adoption of the impairment-only approach did not introduce stricter recognition criteria, and 
therefore, it is unlikely that goodwill impairments under IFRS 3 are larger than the combined 
value of amortizations and impairments under Swedish GAAP.3 We expect most managers not to 
make larger impairments than what they deem absolutely necessary. The rationale for such a 
decision is likely to be that future cash flows are sufficient to retain the current value of 
capitalized goodwill; a signal of positive private information to investors. Hayn and Hughes 
(2006) find that goodwill write-downs are difficult to predict using historical information of the 
acquired entities’ post-acquisition performance. Goodwill impairments lag behind the “economic 
impairment of goodwill” by on average three to four years and for one-third of the sample the lag 
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could be as much as ten years. Overall, we predict that goodwill impairments under IFRS 3 are 
less than the combined value of goodwill amortizations and write-downs under Swedish GAAP. 
Hypothesis 1: Goodwill impairments under IFRS are smaller than the combined value of goodwill 
amortizations and write-downs under Swedish GAAP. 
Hypothesis 1 is an effect of discretionary decisions augmented by primarily IFRS 3, but also IFRS 
1. In particular, choices relating to IFRS 1 are available at the time of adoption only, whereas 
choices relating to IFRS 3 (i.e., the impairment decision) are ongoing after the adoption of the 
standard. Both IFRS 1 and IFRS 3 provide managers with choices that are largely unverifiable 
for external parties (Watts, 2003). Numerous studies of accounting changes suggest that 
managers use discretion in response to economic incentives (Francis et al., 1996; D’Souza et al., 
2000; Fields et al., 2001; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2009).4 We make use of 
these incentives when analyzing choices particular to the initial adoption of IFRS 3. 
 
3.2 Determinants of how the change was implemented 
At the time of the IFRS 3 adoption, firms need to consider which adoption strategy to use and 
decide whether to make a prospective or a retrospective adoption. A prospective adoption means 
that the opening goodwill balance (in our case the opening balance of 2004, the comparative year) 
is kept in aggregate without any adjustments of aggregated amortization. Acquisitions during the 
comparative year are restated and accounted for as prescribed by IFRS 3. A retrospective 
adoption, on the other hand, means that the firms elect to restate all business combination 
applying IFRS 3 from a chosen point in time up until the adoption. In either case, the goodwill 
balance at the time of the adoption will be tested for impairment under IAS 36, and in either case, 
the adjustment is charged to the beginning retained earnings of the comparative year. At the time 
of the IFRS 3 adoption, managers have an opportunity to impact the size and the timing of 
goodwill write-downs as a part of the estimations involved in testing for impairment. They can 
either write-down goodwill without taking it through the income statement to inflate future 
profits, or they can avoid doing so and thereby postponing potential impairments to the future. 
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The choice to impair goodwill is likely to vary across firms. The extant literature suggests a 
number of incentives determining managers’ behavior in situations when accounting discretion is 
allowed (Myers et al., 2007; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Fields et al., 2001; Francis et al., 1996). 
Hypothesis 2: Economic incentives determine the choice to make goodwill write-downs with the 
initial adoption of IFRS 3. 
In particular, we identify four incentives influencing the behavior at the initial adoption of IFRS 
3: the degree of covenant slack, equity market concerns, management’s compensation scheme, 
and the length of management tenure. A number of studies document a tendency to avoid 
accounting choices that negatively affect balances included in debt covenants calculations (Beatty 
et al., 2002; Ramanna and Watts, 2009; Beatty and Weber, 2006). Specifically, Beatty et al., 
(2002) shows that borrowers are prepared to pay higher interest rates to keep voluntary (flexible) 
accounting changes included in covenants calculations. We expect firms with less covenant slack 
will have greater incentives not to impair goodwill at the initial adoption of IFRS 3 since they 
thereby would reduce equity, increase leverage and be closer to a violation of debt covenants. 
Furthermore, previous research suggests a tendency to minimize negative effects on targeted 
earnings numbers when choosing among different strategies in response to new accounting 
standards (Jeter et al., 2008). In particular, Beatty and Weber (2006) find at the adoption of SFAS 
142, firms which need to meet or beat forecasted earnings who expect to report future goodwill 
impairments as part of income from continuing operations are more inclined to take a larger 
initial write-down reported as an adjustment caused by a change in accounting standards. 
Moreover, further research shows that this group of firms is subsequently less inclined to impair 
goodwill in years following the adoption of SFAS 142 (Godfrey and Koh, 2009). We expect firms 
with high equity capital market concerns (i.e., a need to meet or beat earnings forecasts) will have 
greater incentives to impair goodwill at the initial adoption of IFRS 3 to protect future income 
flows from continuing operations compared to those with less equity market concerns. 
In general, earnings-based managerial compensation is negatively associated with the reporting 
of discretionary write-downs like goodwill impairments or restructuring charges (Francis et al., 
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1996). Earnings-based managerial compensation is also a determinant in the choice of income-
increasing voluntary accounting changes over income decreasing voluntary accounting changes 
(Beatty and Weber, 2003). Considering that there are indications that such compensation is 
negatively associated with goodwill impairments at the initial adoption of SFAS 142 if it was 
calculated including in the income decreasing write-off, we expect firms with earnings-based 
managerial compensation will have greater incentives to impair goodwill at the initial adoption of 
IFRS 3 to boost future earnings and performance measures (Beatty and Weber, 2006). 
Finally, management tenure has also been found to affect the tendency to write-down the value of 
assets. Francis et al. (1996) find that discretionary write-downs are more likely if there has been a 
recent change in key management. Other studies show evidence of the other side of the coin, 
namely that firms where the management has been involved in the acquisition are less likely to 
impair goodwill as this would be seen as an admission of failure (Hayn and Hughes, 2006; Beatty 
and Weber, 2006). Therefore, we expect firms with management with longer tenure to have 
greater incentives not to impair goodwill at the initial adoption of IFRS 3. 
 
3.3 Stock market reactions to the adoption of IFRS 3 
Changes in the value of equity are driven by changed expectations of future cash flows to equity 
or the cost of equity capital. When firms with capitalized goodwill adopt IFRS 3 this is likely to 
result in increased current earnings while the underlying cash flows are unaffected. We introduce 
two reasons as to why stock returns are associated with, presumably, disappearing goodwill 
amortizations. One reason is that naïve investors over-emphasize bottom-line accounting 
earnings. Studies in experimental psychology suggest that decision-makers do not consider all 
available information when making decisions (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). These findings also apply 
to financial accounting information and e.g. Libby et al. (2002) review studies that document 
inefficient equity markets and document a number of reasons as to why investors’ use of 
accounting information is biased. The finance and accounting literature reports evidence of 
apparent market mispricing of accruals (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Dechow et al., 2008). In the light 
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of such findings, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) develop a model where more salient information 
that requires less cognitive processing is more extensively used by investors and is to a greater 
extent reflected in stock prices. Investors that over-emphasize bottom-line accounting earnings 
will incorrectly perceive higher current earnings as evidence of a better competitive position and 
higher future cash flows. 
A different reason as to why market values change is that investors previously viewed goodwill 
amortizations as an irrelevant consequence of past investments and that the size of the 
amortization was independent of the success of the business combination and did not provide 
investors with relevant information. Possibly a sustained goodwill balance under IFRS 3 is a 
strong indication of large future operating cash flows, and impairments a stronger indication of 
the opposite. In summary, we have two separate reasons as to why abolished goodwill 
amortizations will have an effect on stock returns.  
Hypothesis 3: The effect of abolished goodwill amortizations on earnings is positively associated to 
stock returns in the IFRS transition period. 
 
4. Methodology 
We use information from OMX Nasdaq to ensure that all firms listed at the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange (SSE) in the years 2001 to 2007 are included in the initial sample. Table 1 shows that 
the number of firms listed at the SSE has decreased during the studied time period. The reduced 
number of firms reporting under foreign GAAP is due to the contemporaneous European switch to 
IFRS in year 2005. Firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to 2005, firms that apply foreign 
GAAP, and real estate and investment companies are excluded from the analysis. In total, we 
have 1,691 observations (232 to 254 per year) as we analyze long-term changes in the accounting 
for goodwill. In the analysis of the IFRS transition we first use data from all 224 firms that 
provide IFRS restatements in their annual report5, except real estate and investment firms. The 
behavior at the initial adoption of IFRS 3 is analyzed using data from the 180 firms withh 
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goodwill in 2004. We examine stock market reactions to the IFRS adoption using information 
from all 226 firms that were listed at the SSE in the end of November 2004 (excluding real estate 
and investment firms). 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Accounting and capital market data is gathered from the SixTrust database and subsequently 
supplemented with manually collected data from annual reports. Specifically, we collected 
information on the amortization, impairment and value of (1) goodwill, (2) other acquired 
intangible assets, and (3) internally generated intangible assets. We also used information from 
all firms’ 2004 quarterly reports and their IFRS restatements (in the 2004 annual reports). Very 
few firms do not provide a detailed classification of their intangible assets in the annual report.6 
All firms listed at the SSE and reporting under Swedish GAAP or IFRS specify the value of 
goodwill, together with goodwill amortizations and impairments in their annual reports. 
Hypothesis 1 tests for differences in goodwill reductions before and after the adoption of IFRS 3. 
To avoid hindsight bias we observe market values in April and pair with accounting information 
from the latest annual report. For most firms, this means accounting information from the year 
ending in December of the previous year. To test hypothesis 1 we use information on the total 
reductions in the value of goodwill that are expensed in the income statement. For the Swedish 
GAAP part of the sample we add goodwill amortizations to write-downs and scale it by total 
assets (GWRED). For the IFRS part of the sample we calculate GWRED as goodwill impairments 
scaled by total assets. We compare before and after the implementation of IFRS 3 using a dummy 
variable taking on the value 1 if the firm reports according to IFRS, otherwise 0. The level of 
goodwill can vary over time and therefore we use goodwill, scaled by total assets, (GW) as a 
control variable. In addition, we control for size, (SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity in April year t+1, and book-to-market (BOOKMKT), measured as the 
market value of equity in April year t+1 divided by the book value from the latest annual report 
announced prior to April year t+1. For all three variables (GW, SIZE and BOOKMKT) we also 
construct IFRS interaction variables.7 
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Hypothesis 2 tests for management’s choices related to the adoption of IFRS 3. At the time of 
adoption, firms were to comply with IFRS in the first accounting period starting from January 
2005. According to IFRS 1 all firms must provide investors with a discussion of the effect of the 
IFRS adoption and restatement of its 2004 key financial figures. Nearly all firms do so in the 
2004 annual report, but a few firms choose to do it in a separate report or in the Q1 2005 report. 
Whenever the case, we use this information in our analysis as it neither leads nor lags the release 
of the annual report by more than three weeks. IFRS 1 requires that firms, at least, announce the 
expected effects on net earnings and shareholder’s equity. In reality, almost all firms provide 
more detailed information and specify goodwill and intangible assets whenever appropriate.8 
Previous research suggests that management’s behavior at the adoption of new accounting 
standards could be driven by individual- and firm-specific incentives. We test for four different 
economic incentives that potentially affect the initial adoption of IFRS 3: covenant slack, equity 
market concerns, earnings-based compensation, and management tenure. Similar to Haynes and 
Hughes (2006) and Beatty and Weber (2006) we run a Probit regression to assess the probability 
of firms reducing goodwill in the initial adoption of IFRS 3. 
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The independent variable, GWREVAL, takes on the value of 1 if a firm chooses to revaluate and 
report impairments of the goodwill balance, and 0 otherwise. We use a measure of interest 
bearing debt to equity as a proxy for the degree of covenant slack (DEBT). The measure used to 
capture the degree of management’s equity market concerns is the firm-specific beta (BETA) 
measured as the abnormal return calculated using the market model.9 Earnings-based 
compensation (D_COMP) is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if management is 
compensated using an earnings-based bonus scheme, otherwise 0. We measure management 
tenure by letting a dummy variable (D_ENTREN) take the value of 1 if the CEO in year t-5 if 
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either the CEO or chairman of the board in the end of year t, otherwise 0. In addition, we control 
for size, profitability, the relative level of goodwill balances and ownership concentration. We 
measure size (SIZE) as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in December 2004. 
Profitability (RTOT) is the net earnings divided by average total assets (measured under Swedish 
GAAP) in year t. The relative level of goodwill balances (GW) is measured as the value of 
capitalized goodwill divided by total assets at the end of year t. Finally, we measure the degree of 
widespread ownership (CLOSE) as the percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders 
(the data is obtained from Sundqvist, 2005).10 
Hypothesis 3 concerns investors’ reactions to the IFRS 3 adoption. We construct two portfolios; 
one consisting of goodwill-intensive firms and one consisting of firms that have no capitalized 
goodwill. If IFRS 3 leads to smaller goodwill accruals this increases the reported earnings of the 
former portfolio. The difference between the two portfolios’ returns is observed in a period of time 
when we expect that investors will observe changes in earnings that are caused by IFRS 3. For 
two reasons it is unlikely that changes in investors’ expectations about the future (if any) occur at 
specific dates: First, the investors’ perceptions are likely to be influenced by market-wide factors 
such as articles in the business press. Second, investors’ perceptions will be more affected by early 
providers of annual reports than late providers.  
The portfolios are formed well before the adoption of IFRS 3, but not before Swedish media took 
notice of its consequences (Dagens Industri, Nyhetsbyrån Direkt).  Most firms carried out the first 
analysis of the effect of the IFRS transition in the Q4 2004 report.11 We therefore analyze the 
seven months between 1st of December 2004 and the 30th of June 2005 (transition window). By 
then, all firms with calendar fiscal years have reported both an IFRS restatement and its first 
IFRS based quarterly report.12 The sample contains all 226 firms reporting under Swedish GAAP 
and who are listed on December 1st 2004.13 Portfolios are formed on the basis of goodwill scaled by 
total assets (GW). For reliability reasons we use information from the latest annual report issued 
prior to December 1st 2004. A comparison is made of the dividend-adjusted abnormal returns of 
the decile of firms with the highest GW to the returns of firms with no goodwill (and hence are 
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unaffected by the IFRS 3 adoption).14 To ensure the robustness we make controls for abnormal 
earnings, size and book-to-market. These controls are further described in the empirical section. 
 
5. Empirical findings 
5.1 Effects of the adoption on financial statements 
Table 2 reports the level of and changes in goodwill and intangible assets over the years 2001 to 
2004 under Swedish GAAP and 2005 to 2007 under IFRS. While the abolishment of goodwill 
amortizations led to larger goodwill impairments the additional impairments are much lower 
than what the amortizations reported under Swedish GAAP were. Goodwill impairments 
decreased from 2.1% under Swedish GAAP, to 0.4% under IFRS15 and total goodwill reductions 
decreased from 3.7% under Swedish GAAP to only 0.4% under IFRS.16 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
The amount of goodwill decreased steadily in the years prior to the IFRS adoption only to 
increase substantially thereafter. In 2007, the average goodwill balance has doubled compared to 
2004. This increase in goodwill balances is partially driven by an increased acquisition activity 
between 2006 and 2007, but also by the retroactive implementation of IFRS 3 in 2004. The total 
amount of intangible assets also increases in the studied time period. Like goodwill, the specific 
acquired intangible assets (e.g. patents, trademarks and licenses) and internally developed 
intangible assets increase steadily between 2004 and 2007. Under IFRS 3, acquiring firms must, 
if possible, identify and separately report specific acquired intangible assets. This increased the 
extent of such intangibles, but the increase between 2004 and 2007 is only 1.6% (including 
acquisitions of non-goodwill related specific intangible assets), while the increase in goodwill is 
5.1%. Hence most of the goodwill was never recognized separately. 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
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Table 3 displays the results from the regression analysis used to test hypothesis 1. We use both a 
fixed-effects estimation (to control for time-specific effects) and a Tobit estimation (as the 
dependent variable is censored between 0 and 1).17 Table 3 shows the effect of the adoption of 
IFRS 3 on goodwill reductions (GWRED). We control for the level of goodwill (GW), Size (SIZE) 
and book-to-market (BOOKMKT). We also interact all variables with the IFRS indicator. As 
predicted, the IFRS indicator is negative and significant (p-values: 0.017 and 0.000) which 
suggests that goodwill reductions decrease after the IFRS 3 adoption. In general, firms with more 
goodwill in their balance sheets make larger amortizations and impairments (p-values: 0.001 and 
0.000). However, we find a shift in the association between GWRED and GW following the 
adoption of IFRS 3. When goodwill amortizations were abolished firms with substantial amounts 
of goodwill no longer made large reductions. Interestingly enough, we also find that large firms 
have significantly smaller goodwill reductions (p-values: 0.000 and 0.000), but this effect partially 
disappears after the adoption of IFRS 3. One explanation to this could be that they amortized 
goodwill over a longer time prior to the adoption of IFRS 3. 
 
5.2 Determinants of how the change was implemented 
Panel A of Table 4 reports that among the 224 firms providing IFRS restatements 180 firms 
(80.4%) report goodwill, or changes in goodwill, in their 2004 financial statements.18 Most firms 
with capitalized goodwill stated in their IFRS restatement that IFRS 3 constitute the most 
important effect on their financial reporting (93.3%). 
Under Swedish GAAP 34 firms make an impairment of goodwill in 2004. In the IFRS 
restatement, 21 firms make an additional impairment charge under IFRS. Out of these 21 firms, 
12 did not make any impairment under Swedish GAAP and in total 43 firms make impairments 
under IFRS. Not a single firm makes additional IFRS impairments larger than its 2004 goodwill 
amortization (under Swedish GAAP). The total value of the additional impairments is MSEK 
348.5, to be compared with the estimated value of abolished amortizations of MSEK 16,024.1 in 
year 2004. In the transition year, 14 firms revalued acquisitions and 36 firms reclassified goodwill 
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from past acquisitions (2004 and earlier) to a specific acquired intangible asset. The value of these 
reclassifications amount to MSEK 2,951.9 which is less than 1% of the total value of capitalized 
goodwill in year 2004 (untabulated results). Finally, we find that 10 firms reverse a restructuring 
reserve created in conjunction with past acquisitions and 11 firms reverse negative goodwill 
arising from past acquisitions. 
 [Insert Table 4 and 5 about here] 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that for the 224 firms included in the sample the average net earnings 
increase with 17.8% from the mandatory adoption of IFRS (from MSEK 609.8 to 705.9). Most of 
this increase relates to goodwill-intensive firms, as the abolished goodwill amortizations, 
calculated also on firms with no goodwill, make up 82% of the total change in earnings. Net 
earnings scaled by total assets increase with 1.5% because of the abolishment of goodwill 
amortizations. We also note that the effect on equity is less pronounced and that the goodwill 
effect constitutes a minor part of the total balance sheet effect. 
The test of hypothesis 2 is presented in Table 5. We use a standard Probit regression model using 
data from the 180 firms reporting goodwill in 2004. As reported in Panel A of Table 5, firms with 
tenured management are likely to rely more on debt than equity financing. We also find that 
large firms are on average more likely to pay earnings-based compensation and they are more 
profitable. This supports the sign of the coefficient in our test of goodwill impairment behavior in 
the year of transition. However, as discussed above, the coefficient is insignificant. Furthermore, 
firms with a less dispersed ownership structure are, on average, less goodwill-intensive and more 
profitable, In addition, these firms are also less equity market concerned, which is reflected in the 
negative and significant correlation between CLOSELY and BETA. Finally, the analysis also 
suggests that high risk firms (more equity market concerned) relies less on debt finance, are 
small, less profitable and goodwill-intensive. This could be interpreted as if these firms, which are 
predicted to be more inclined to make goodwill impairments to secure future income streams, are 
unable to do so since that would reduce their equity to an unacceptable level and, they therefore, 
do not impair goodwill at the time of the IFRS 3 adoption. 
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Panel B shows that all test variables except BETA take on the predicted sign. However, only one 
of these variables, D_ENTREN, is significant with a coefficient of -0.619 (two-tailed p-value: 
0.086). We interpret this as some evidence that management involved in the original acquisition 
were less inclined to impair goodwill at the initial adoption of IFRS 3.19 It has to be emphasized 
that most firms chose to do nothing and hence it is difficult to identify differences within our 
sample. The empirical results do not indicate that there were substantial active choices made to 
act in accordance with economic incentives. 
 
5.3 Stock market reactions to the adoption of IFRS 3 
We predict that firms reporting large goodwill amortizations under Swedish GAAP will report a 
one-time earnings increase when IFRS 3 is adopted and the impairment test substitute 
amortizations. If investors interpret (correctly or incorrectly) such an increase in current earnings 
as an indication of higher future cash flows then stock prices will increase as well. We examine 
abnormal stock returns in a seven month transition window surrounding the adoption of IFRS 3. 
Table 6 reports our findings as we construct portfolios on the basis of goodwill, scaled by total 
assets, as reported in the latest annual report prior to portfolio formation.20 Overall, the firms 
earn high returns in the transition window. The (undisclosed) average absolute dividend-adjusted 
return is 20.0% and the abnormal return is 14.0%. The goodwill-intensive firms yield an 
abnormal return of 24.5% whereas firms without capitalized goodwill yield an abnormal return of 
8.0%. The difference, 16.5%, is statistically significant (p-value: 0.024). The non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test of medians also suggests a statistically significant difference (p-value: 0.014). 
To ensure that the results are not driven by an underlying higher earnings growth rate we 
estimate the abnormal earnings for each firm using last year’s earnings as a benchmark. When 
doing this it is particularly important to exclude IFRS 3 effects from the analysis. In the 
transition window most firms release two quarterly reports; one under local GAAP (Q4-04) and 
one under IFRS (Q1-05). If a quarterly report is released in accordance with IFRS we impute one 
fourth of its 2004 goodwill amortization (if any). We add these adjusted quarterly net earnings 
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figures together and divide them with net earnings from the same quarters one year ago. As 
reported in Panel A of Table 6 earnings increase, on average, by 6.6%. This is the increase in 
earnings beyond the effect of IFRS 3. Goodwill-intensive firms yield higher abnormal returns even 
though their abnormal earnings are lower (+3.1%) than firms without goodwill (+6.1%). The 
reason becomes evident when the effect of abolishing amortizations is studied (GWeffect). For the 
goodwill-intensive firms a removal of amortizations boost earnings to a much larger extent than 
the size of the abnormal earnings. For the full sample, the total earnings effect of removed 
goodwill amortizations and abnormal earnings is higher for goodwill-intensive firms (0.094) than 
it is for firms without goodwill (0.063). This is what caused the abnormal return. We firmly 
conclude that the differences in abnormal returns are not caused by underlying differences in 
abnormal earnings. We also see that goodwill-intensive firms are larger, but that there are no 
differences between the two groups in terms of their book-to-market ratios. 
Next, we divide firms into two equally-large groups based on of their size and book-to-market. 
Panel B shows that the difference between the two portfolios remains statistically significant (p-
values: 0.032 and 0.016) for small firms. As expected, small firms have less capitalized goodwill. 
Again, the goodwill-intensive firms have a lower earnings growth rate but higher abnormal 
returns. We find no difference in terms of size and book-to-market. Large firms tend to have more 
capitalized goodwill and in the transition period they earn higher abnormal returns than small 
firms, irrespective of goodwill intensity. Interestingly enough, we find no statistically significant 
difference within the sample of large firms. The probable reason for this is that the increase in 
earnings related to the abolishment of goodwill amortizations (0.040) is not large enough to 
counter the underlying substantial difference in abnormal earnings (0.060).  Finally, Panel C 
displays returns after sorting on the book-to-market ratio. In both groups the difference between 
portfolios are similar to those reported for the total sample in Panel A (i.e., 16.8% and 18.2% as 
compared with 16.5% in Panel A). The parametric and non-parametric tests of the differences 
show only a weak statistical significance, but we attribute part of this to a smaller sample. We 
note that despite that the total earnings effect of removed goodwill amortizations and abnormal 
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earnings is not higher for goodwill-intensive firms (-0.036) than it is for firms without goodwill 
(0.068) the abnormal returns are much higher. 
In summary, we find empirical evidence confirming that goodwill-intensive firms outperform 
firms unaffected by the IFRS 3 adoption. This effect is independent of systematic risk, abnormal 
earnings and the book-to-market factor. We find that the high abnormal returns are not present 
among large firms. However, the test of hypothesis 1 shows that large firms report lower goodwill 
reductions (particularly prior to the IFRS 3 adoption) and hence abolished goodwill amortizations 
had such a limited effect on reported earnings that it did not offset the considerably lower 
abnormal earnings yielded by goodwill-intensive firms. However, most goodwill-intensive firms 
experiencing high abnormal returns are large firms and hence we are not in any way 
documenting a small-firm effect. 
 
6. Conclusions 
IFRS 3 was the most important change at the Swedish adoption of IFRS in January 2005. This is 
not only suggested by the numbers reported in the IFRS restatements, but also recognized by 
management in the IFRS restatements. Reported earnings increased as a consequence of 
abolished goodwill amortizations and the long term effect (up to 2007) is an increased level of 
capitalized goodwill. This increase is caused partly by an increased acquisition frequency and 
partly by the abandonment of goodwill amortizations. That abandonment, so far, has not been 
accompanied by increased impairments of goodwill. We note that most firms tend not to reclassify 
goodwill into other, specific, intangible assets. Our test of determinants of management write-
down behavior in the year of the adoption show some weak indications that managers with a 
tenure of at least five years tend not to write-down goodwill at the time of adoption. More than 
80% of the firms with capitalized goodwill chose a prospective adoption of IFRS 3 and decided to 
do nothing but to reverse amortizations in the transition year. 
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Firms with substantial amounts of goodwill experienced a considerable increase in earnings when 
IFRS 3 was adopted. We find evidence that the stock market revalued goodwill-intensive firms 
significantly upwards in the seven month period surrounding the IFRS adoption. Firms with no 
capitalized goodwill yield considerably lower abnormal returns, although they earn higher 
abnormal earnings. The association between the effect of abolished goodwill amortizations and 
the level of abnormal earnings appear important. Large firms made relatively low goodwill 
reductions prior to the adoption of IFRS 3 (hypothesis 1), and therefore, the effect on earnings 
caused by abolished amortizations was less than half of the effect for small firms. We interpret 
this as the prime reason to why large goodwill-intensive firms did not yield higher abnormal 
returns. In the U.S., where goodwill prior to SFAS 142 often was written off over a very long 
period of time, it appears unlikely that a similar upward revaluation of goodwill-intensive firms 
would have occurred. However, if the same passive adoption of IFRS 3 is experienced in other 
European countries, where goodwill often was amortized over shorter periods of time, it is likely 
that the stock market revalued goodwill-intensive firms upwards in the same manner. 
We initially discussed two reasons to why goodwill-intensive firms experience higher abnormal 
returns within the transition window. We cannot discriminate between the two explanations but 
it seems more likely that investors focused on “bottom-line” earnings and saw goodwill-intensive 
firms as more attractive investments when their current earnings increased (regardless of the 
underlying cash flows). A first reason for this explanation is the apparently strong association 
between abnormal earnings and the effect of the abolished goodwill amortizations. A second 
reason is that the impairment testing requirement was in effect before the IFRS 3 adoption. 
The results suggest that firms are more dependent than ever on the decision of impairing an 
unidentified intangible asset or not. Research in the U.S. has shown that goodwill impairments 
often are made excessively late (Hayn and Hughes, 2006). Given that earnings management is 
quite common in Europe, and that goodwill balances are considerable (and will not be smaller 
unless managers choose to make impairments), more research is needed to explore the effects of 
the specific European case. In particular, more research is needed to examine how relevant 
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goodwill impairments are to investors under IFRS 3, and of how economic incentives drive the 
decision to impair goodwill or not. 
 
  
24 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection Process 
 Swedish GAAP  IFRS 
 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 2006 2007 
Listed firms (April in year 
t+1) 
 
295 
 
291 
 
275 
 
270 
Listed firms (April in year 
t+1) 
 
267 
 
268 
 
263 
Foreign GAAP -8 -7 -7 -7 Foreign GAAP -4 -3 -3 
IFRS -7 -8 -9 -12 Swedish GAAP -12 - - 
Investment and real estate -23 -22 -19 -19 Investment and real estate -19 -23 -26 
         
Observations in sample 257 254 240 232 Observations in sample 232 242 234 
 
We use all firms listed at the Stockholm Stock Exchange in the years 2001 to 2007, except for firms 
reporting under foreign GAAP or that are real estate or investment companies. In total, the sample consists 
of 1691 firm-year observations. Please note that 12 firms with non-calendar fiscal years filed their reports 
under Swedish GAAP in 2005. 
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Table 4: Analysis of IFRS Restatements 
Panel A: Monetary Consequences of the IFRS Adoption  
  
N 
 
%-age 
 
MSEK 
 
      
Firms with IFRS restatements  224    
      
Number of firms reporting goodwill 
under Swedish GAAP 
  
180 
 
80.4% 
  
      
Most important change  168 93.3%   
Additional goodwill impairment  21 11.7% 368.4  
Revaluation (retrospective adoption)  14 7.8%   
Reclassification of goodwill  36 20.% 2,951.9  
Removal of restructuring reserve  10 5.6%   
Removal of negative goodwill  11 6.1%   
      
Panel B: Restatement Effects of IFRS 3 
 Swedish 
GAAP 
IFRS IFRS 3 
effect 
Other 
Effects 
      
Mean net earnings (million Swedish kronor)  609.8 705.9 87.8 8.3 
Mean net earnings / total assets  2.5% 4.2% +1.5% +0.3% 
Mean equity (million Swedish kronor)  4,464.8 4,951.8 87.8 399.3 
Mean equity / total assets  45.2% 51.3% +1.5% +4.7% 
      
The analysis is performed on all 224 firms listed at the Stockholm Stock Exchange who (1) provide 2004 
financial statements in accordance with Swedish GAAP, (2) are not a pure investment or real estate 
company, and (3) provide an IFRS restatement.  
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Table 5: Analysis of the Propensity to Revalue Goodwill at the Time of Adoption 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Pairwise Correlations (p-values) 
 DEBT BETA D_COMP D_ENTREN SIZE RTOT GW CLOSE 
DEBT 
 
1.000        
BETA -0.379 
(0.000) 
 
1.000       
D_COMP -0.016 
(0.846) 
 
-0.087 
(0.295) 
1.000      
D_ENTREN 0.219 
(0.008) 
-0.073 
(0.377) 
 
-0.040 
(0.630) 
1.000     
SIZE 0.067 
(0.422) 
-0.237 
(0.004) 
 
0.333 
(0.000) 
0.132 
(0.111) 
1.000    
RTOT 0.102 
(0.217) 
-0.226 
(0.006) 
 
0.245 
(0.003) 
0.134 
(0.106) 
0.368 
(0.000) 
1.000   
GW -0.043 
(0.609) 
0.344 
(0.000) 
 
-0.112 
(0.176) 
-0.086 
(0.298) 
-0.094 
(0.258) 
-0.278 
(0.000) 
1.000  
CLOSE 0.112 
(0.178) 
-0.393 
(0.000) 
-0.058 
(0.482) 
0.138 
(0.096) 
0.039 
(0.638) 
0.236 
(0.004) 
-0.308 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
 Panel B: The effects of management incentives to revalue goodwill at the initial adoption of IFRS 3 
 !"#$%&  '	 
 '  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 '   
 '  () 
 '  ** 
 '   

 '   
 '   
 '+  (! 
   
  Probit estimation 
 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Intercept ? -0.969 0.961 0.313 
BET1 (+) -0.392 0.301 0.193 
DEBT (-) -0.307 0.271 0.257 
D_COMP (+) 0.085 0.350 0.807 
D_ENTREN (-) -0.619 0.360 0.086 
SIZE (+/-) 0.020 0.090 0.825 
RTOT (+) -1.370 1.207 0.256 
GWTA (+/-) -1.441 1.358 0.289 
CLOSE (+/-) 0.728 0.765 0.341 
     
Pseudo R2  0.117    
 
The analysis is performed on all 180 firms that are listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and (1) follow 
Swedish GAAP in 2004, (2) are no pure real estate or investment company, and (3) have goodwill capitalized 
in accordance with an IFRS restatement. GWREVAL is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a firm 
has made an impairment of goodwill in the IFRS restatement. DEBT is the ratio of interest bearing debt to 
the book value of equity, as measured according to Swedish GAAP the annual report containing the IFRS 
restatement. BETA is estimated using monthly observations for the 24 to 48 months (min/max) prior to 
December 2004. The benchmark index is the AFGX index (the most commonly used index in Sweden 
composed of an equally-weighted average of the largest firms). D_COMP is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 when management, according to the annual report containing the IFRS restatement, has some 
component of its compensation tied to accounting earnings after depreciations, otherwise 0. D_ENTREN is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 when the firm’s CEO at year t-5 (in most cases 1999) is either the CEO 
or chairman of the board when the IFRS 3 is adopted. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
value of equity in April 2005. RTOT is the firm’s return on total assets measured as net earnings divided by 
the average total assets for the year containing the IFRS restatement. GW is the firm’s ratio of capitalized 
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goodwill to total assets, measured in the year of the IFRS restatement. CLOSE is the total voting power of 
the five largest shareholders, measured December 31st 2004. 
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Table 6 – Difference in stock returns depending on goodwill-intensity 
  Abnormal return  Controls 
  Mean Median  GW GWeff AbnEarn Size B/M 
Panel A – All firms          
All firms  0.140 0.116  0.119 0.020 0.066 3.098 0.532 
Goodwill-intensive firms  0.245 0.205  0.440 0.056 0.038 3.177 0.454 
Firms without goodwill  0.080 0.073  0.000 0.002 0.061 2.824 0.449 
Difference, p-value  0.024 0.014    0.769 0.095 0.948 
          
Panel B – Size sorting          
Small firms          
Goodwill-intensive firms  0.291 0.277  0.398 0.082 0.029 2.371 0.467 
Firms without goodwill  -0.002 -0.039  0.000 0.002 0.039 2.461 0.492 
Difference, p-value  0.032 0.016    0.961 0.552 0.828 
          
Large firms          
Goodwill-intensive firms  0.215 0.196  0.466 0.040 0.043 3.694 0.445 
Firms without goodwill  0.239 0.199  0.000 0.001 0.103 3.524 0.366 
Difference, p-value  0.401 0.359    0.300 0.470 0.496 
          
Panel C – B/M sorting          
Low B/M ratios          
Goodwill-intensive firms  0.318 0.238  0.441 0.046 0.147 3.330 0.270 
Firms without goodwill  0.150 0.126  0.000 0.003 0.057 2.967 0.206 
Difference, p-value  0.072 0.048    0.392 0.206 0.018 
          
High B/M ratios          
Goodwill-intensive firms  0.151 0.188  0.438 0.069 -0.105 2.977 0.693 
Firms without goodwill  -0.031 -0.026  0.000 0.000 0.068 2.596 0.834 
Difference, p-value  0.061 0.061    0.139 0.227 0.196 
          
The analysis is performed on 226 firms listed at the Stockholm Stock Exchange at the 1st of December 2004 
and the dividend-adjusted is estimated until June 30th 2005. The abnormal return is measured as the firm’s 
actual return less its expected return, where the latter is estimated as follows. We set the risk-free interest 
rate (rf), and the market risk premium (rm) to 4% and 6%, respectively. We then calculate the firm’s beta 
using monthly returns for 24 to 48 months (minimum/maximum) prior to December 2004. Firms with fewer 
than 24 observations (12 firms) are assigned beta 1. Only one firm has a beta more than 3 standard 
deviations from the average. The expected return is calculated as: (7/12) x [rf + β x (rm - rf)]. Goodwill-
intensive firms are those firms belonging to the decile of firms with the highest ratio of capitalized goodwill 
to total assets according to the last annual report issued prior to December 1st 2004. Firms without 
capitalized goodwill are all firms without capitalized goodwill according to the last annual report issued 
prior to December 1st 2004. GW is the ratio of capitalized goodwill to total assets. GWeff is the effect on 
earnings of abolishing goodwill amortizations measured as the firm’s goodwill amortizations in the annual 
report of 2004 divided by two, and divided by shareholders equity. AbnEarn is the abnormal earnings 
measured as the firm’s actual quarterly net earnings reported in the studied time period (1/12/2004 to 
30/06/2005) less the actual net earnings of the same quarters one year earlier, and divided by shareholders 
equity. If a quarterly report is released in accordance with IFRS we impute one fourth of its 2004 goodwill 
amortization (if any). This is the increase in earnings beyond the effect of IFRS 3. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity at December 1st 2004. B/M is the ratio of the firm’s book value 
of equity (in the last quarterly report prior to December 1st 2004) divided by its market value of equity at 
December 1st 2004. Panel A reports an analysis based on all 226 firms. Panels B and C report separate 
analyses on each half of the sample (split on the basis of median market value of equity and median book-to-
market). The difference is presented as p-values using a parametric t-test and a non-parametric (Mann-
Whitney) test of medians.  
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1 These are only recommendations and Swedish law has not decided on a maximum economic life. In 2003 RR 1:00 was 
altered and this paved way for using a longer economic life than 20 years whenever appropriate. In 2004 two firms (Atlas 
Copco and Electrolux) applied an economic life longer than 20 years. 
2 In an interesting study by Ramanna (2008) it is suggested that SFAS 142, at least partly, is a response to political 
pressures arising from the proposal to abolish the pooling method (SFAS 141). 
3 However, IFRS 3 (in combination with IAS 38) specifies a more detailed testing procedure which possibly could result in 
different outcomes. 
4 There is a substantial literature on voluntary accounting method changes, both within individual countries, and between 
local GAAP and IFRS. As these studies are greatly influenced by factors unrelated to our study we ignore them here. 
5 A few firms without consolidated financial statements do not switch to IFRS as they fall outside of the EU Council 
Regulation 1606/2002. 
6 When it is not possible to distinguish between different forms of intangible assets we label them other (acquired) 
intangible assets. 
7 Another approach could be to include the control variables related to managerial discretion tested in hypothesis 2 in the 
model. However, we chose not to since hypothesis 1 tests the long-term effect in general while hypothesis 2 tests the 
behaviour at the time of the adoption. 
8 When no information is provided, we assume that goodwill amortizations from 2004 are reversed and that no 
reclassifications of goodwill are made. This approach is verified by information provided in the 2005 annual report. 
9 The firm specific beta is measured as the abnormal return calculated using the market model. The risk-free interest rate 
is set at 4%, the market risk premium is set at 6%. The beta is estimated using monthly observations for the 24 to 48 
months (min/max) prior to December 2004. The benchmark index is the AFGX index (the most commonly used index in 
Sweden composed of an equally-weighted average of the largest stocks). Firms with fewer than 24 monthly observations 
(12) are assigned beta 1 (i.e., the market risk). 
10
 Another approach could be to measure the free float, the number of shares traded during a period relative to the 
number of outstanding shares, however, we do not believe that this would produce qualitatively different results. 
11 We note that a few firms opted to provide partial IFRS reconciliations already in their 2004 quarterly reports. This 
should lead to a partial anticipation of the effect of the accounting transition on the firm’s earnings prior to the end of 
2004 and create a bias that goes against our results (i.e. it can be expected that the true effect of the information on higher 
goodwill persistence on the valuation of goodwill-intensive firms was even higher). 
12 Another approach could have been to use a longer window to measure the return, in the literature, a 12 month period 
starting four months after the of the fiscal year is regularly used (Alford et al., 1994). However, our judgment is that, in 
this case, our seven month window captures the period of time when most value relevant information about the IFRS 
transition enters the market. 
13 We trim the sample by excluding observations with returns more than three standard deviations away (three firms). 
The results are qualitatively unchanged from this procedure. Two firms were delisted in the transition period, but they do 
not affect the analysis as they both had small amounts of goodwill. 
14 The abnormal return is measured as the actual return less the expected return, where the latter is measured as follows. 
We set the risk-free interest rate (rf), and the market risk premium (rm) to 4% and 6%, respectively. We then calculate 
each firm’s beta using monthly returns for 24 to 48 months (minimum/maximum) prior to December 2004. Firms with 
fewer than 24 observations (12) are assigned beta 1. Only one firm has a beta more than 3 standard deviations from the 
average. The expected return is then measured as: (7/12) x [rf + β x (rm - rf)]. 
15 An analysis of the composition of firms making impairment charges over time, reveals that there is some overlap but 
the lion’s share of the write-downs made are not made by the same firms over time. During the Swedish GAAP period 
most firms that make impairment charges are operating in the manufacturing industry (the largest write downs are made 
by firms such as Skanska, Atlas Copco, Electrolux, and Ericsson) mixed with a few IT firms such as Telelogic. During the 
IFRS period, the prevalence of firms from the manufacturing sector is once again high (the largest write-downs are made 
by Skanska, Swedish Match, NCC, Trelleborg, and Volvo). Other firms that made large write-downs were Skandia 
(insurance) and Tele2 (telecommunication). 
16 It should be noted that by deflating goodwill with total assets we ignore that the value of total assets also change due to 
regulatory changes and related managerial choices. 
17 This violates the assumption that the dependent variable is continuously distributed between -∞ and +∞, which in turn, 
results in improbable predicted values, biased parameter estimates, and invalid inferences (Matolcsy and Wyatt 2006; 
Green 2000). 
18 Eight firms did not provide consolidated financial statements and hence they did not have to switch from Swedish 
GAAP. Twelve firms used non-calendar accounting periods and hence their IFRS restatements came later in year 2005. 
19 We also run a censored regression using the relative magnitude of the goodwill impairment write-downs to total assets 
as an independent continuous variable. This resulted in qualitatively the same results as the Probit estimation. 
20 In undisclosed tests we also form portfolios on the basis of information in the latest quarterly report and on the basis of 
goodwill amortizations. We also conduct tests where we exclude firms with negative earnings (as information about 
goodwill amortizations might be less relevant for loss-making firms). All of these alternative ways to form portfolios 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
largely produce the same findings as those documented in the body of the paper. Our choice of portfolio formation 
procedure is driven by prudence and reliability concerns. 
